


































diffeomorphisms that preserve the manifold structure of 
curved spaces, the equivalent of the metric field in GR (See 
Figure 3).   
Depending	on	one’s	perspective	with	respect	to	
GR,	as	we	will	see,	spacetime	need	not	be	comprised	of	
“points”	but	rather	can	be	understood	as	the	“set	of	all	
possible	events	in	the	universe”	(my	emphasis)	in	the	
past,	present,	and	future3.		GR,	as	I	will	demonstrate,	
supports	Leibniz’s	argument	since	according	to	
Einstein,	space	as	opposed	to	what	fills	it	“has	no	
separate	existence”	for	if	the	gravitational	field,	
represented	by	the	metric	tensor	gμν,	were	to	be	removed,	absolutely	nothing	would	
remain.		Spacetime	“does	not	claim	an	existence	on	its	own,	but	only	as	a	structural	quality	
of	the	field”,	Einstein	explained	in	“Relativity	and	the	Problem	of	Space”	published	in		
																																																								
3	Geroch,	Robert,	General	Relativity:	From	A	to	B	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	
1981),	p.	8	
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1952.4		On	time	itself,	GR	complicates	(in	the	sense	that	time	is	curved)	the	main	arguments	
made	by	the	two	early	Modern	philosophers.		On	one	hand,	in	GR	and	the	Special	Theory	of	
Relativity	(SR),	time	is	not	the	sum	total	of	all	universal	instants,	but	on	the	other	hand,	it	is	
defined	over	individual	events	in	spacetime	which	corresponds	with	Leibniz’s	relationist	
understanding	of	time.		The	simultaneity	of	events	is	
relativistically	determined	by	observers’	light-
cones5,	which	produces	counter-intuitive	results	at	
the	least,	and	some	mathematically	curious	but	
physically	impossible	outcomes	(Figures	4a	and	4b).		
I	will	also	discuss	the	parallels	between	the	18th	
century	debate	and	the	split	between	background	
independent	and	dependent	theories	in	quantum	
physics.		Overall,	as	I	will	demonstrate,	Leibniz-Clarke	foreshadows	the	foundational	issues	
of	contemporary	theoretical	physics.		Before	delving	into	Leibniz’s	points	against	Newton,	
and	Clarke’s	counterarguments,	we	must	first	consider	how	Newton	distinguished	absolute	
from	relative	space,	time,	and	motion	in	The	Principia6.			
In	the	Scholium	following	the	eighth	definition	of	that	text,	Newton	outlines	the	
properties,	causes,	and	effects	of	absolute	and	relative	space,	time,	and	motion.		While	he	
																																																								
4	Einstein,	Albert,	“Relativity	and	the	Problem	of	Space”	(1952),	
www.relativitybook.com/resources/Einstein_space.html	
5	Light	is	what	illuminates	the	events,	and	its	rate	of	transmission	(the	maximum	speed	in	
the	universe)	to	observers	is	limited	by	its	constant	speed,	a	key	variable	in	both	SR	and	
GR.				
6	Newton,	Isaac,	and	Andrew	Janiak	(editor).	Philosophical	Writings	(Cambridge,	UK:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	2004)	
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defines	absolute	space	as	“homogenous	and	immovable”7,	he	does	not	prove	the	existence	
of	space	ontologically	so	much	as	posit	primary	and	unmoving	places	(what	space	consists	
of)	as	reference	points	by	which	to	determine	absolute	motions.		For	example,	a	body	that	
is	only	relatively	at	rest	with	respect	to	a	moving	ship,	but	is	moving	truly	and	absolutely	if	
the	earth	is	truly	at	rest8.		This	is	a	mere	thought	experiment,	since	Newton	suggests	“it	is	
possible	that	there	is	no	body	truly	at	rest”	or	even	if	there	is	in	the	regions	of	the	fixed	
stars,	it	“cannot	be	known	from	the	position	of	bodies	in	relation	to	one	another	in	our	
regions	whether	or	not	any	of	these	maintains	a	given	position	with	relation	to	that	distant	
body.”9		Since	absolute	places	cannot	be	known	by	our	senses,	we	use	relative	places	and	
motions	in	their	stead	to	approximate.		Nevertheless,	absolute	motion	is	theoretically	
defined	with	respect	to	unmoving	places.		Places	that	are	unmoving	are	“those	that	all	keep	
given	positions	in	relation	to	one	another	from	infinity	to	infinity.”10		Thus,	Newton’s	
concept	of	absolute	space	is	indeed,	a	relative	notion,	since	it	refers	to	places	that	are	
relatively	at	rest.		Newton’s	concept	of	absolute	space	is	not	probative	but	rather	serves	as	a	
useful	concept	for	physics.			
	 Newton	does	delineate	two	properties	and	effects	of	absolute	motion.		First,	parts,	
which	are	relatively	at	rest	with	respect	to	a	whole,	participate	in	its	absolute	motion.		This	
is	the	case	of	a	passenger	in	a	moving	vehicle.		Second,	absolute	circular	motion	can	be	
distinguished	from	relative	motion	in	terms	of	its	centrifugal	effects.		This	was	
demonstrated	by	one	of	Newton’s	most	famous	experiments,	in	which	water	initially	
																																																								
7	Ibid.,	64	
8	Ibid.,	65	
9	Ibid.,	66	
10	Ibid.,	67	
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demonstrated	by	one	of	
Newton’s	most	famous	
experiments,	in	which	water	
initially	revolves	in	a	bucket	
that	is	set	in	motion	by	the	
unraveling	of	an	attached	cord.		
The	water	subsequently	
recedes	from	the	middle	and	
rises	up	the	sides	of	the	bucket,	
assuming	a	concave	shape	while	it	is	relatively	at	rest	with	respect	to	the	vessel.		The	
water’s	rise	shows	that	it	is	receding	from	the	axis	of	motion,	and	also	that	it	does	not	
depend	on	a	change	of	position	with	respect	to	surrounding	bodies.		The	latter	distinction	
is	proven	since	the	water	was	relatively	at	rest	with	respect	to	the	bucket	when	its	“true	
circular	motion”	was	greatest	and	that	its	relative	motion	was	greatest	when	there	was	no	
endeavor	on	the	part	of	the	water	to	recede	from	the	axis.11		Thus,	for	Newton,	the	absolute	
motion	of	a	body	does	not	require	relative	motion.			
	 Absolute	time	“flows	uniformly”	and	“cannot	be	changed”	and	is	without	reference	
to	anything	external,	according	to	Newton.		Things	are	placed	in	time	in	an	order	of	
succession,	but	in	an	absolute	way.		This	is	in	contrast	to	relative	time,	which	is	used	to	
account	for	natural	days,	considered	equal	for	the	purpose	of	measuring	time,	but	which	
																																																								
11	Ibid.,	68-9	
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are	actually	unequal.		Newton	argues	that	pendulum	clock	
experiments	as	well	as	eclipses	of	the	satellites	of	Jupiter	
prove	absolute	time,	derived	from	astronomical	
equations.12	
Leibniz’s	Challenge	to	Newton	in	The	Leibniz-Clarke	
Debate	
	 Leibniz	does	not	believe	in	the	reality	of	space,	nor	
does	he	use	absolute	space	when	thinking	about	physics.		
He	also	does	not	support	Newton’s	concept	of	absolute	
time.		Motion,	for	Leibniz,	“is	not	something	entirely	real”,	
he	declared	in	his	Discourse	on	Metaphysics,	for	“when	several	bodies	change	position	
among	themselves,	it	is	not	possible	to	determine,	merely	from	consideration	of	these	
changes,	to	which	body	we	should	attribute	motion	or	rest.”13		Clarke,	representing	Newton	
in	Leibniz-Clarke,	is	explicit	in	defining	space	as	a	property	that	is	one,	infinite,	and	
indivisible,	in	his	Third	Reply.		Leibniz	argues,	instead,	for	his	relational	theory	of	space	for	
three	main	reasons:	1)	Epistemologically,	space	can	be	understood	purely	on	the	basis	of	
relations	between	bodies;	2)	In	a	homogenous	and	uniform	space	all	points	would	be	
indistinguishable,	in	violation	of	his	Principles	of	Sufficient	Reason	(PSR)	and	Identity	of	
Indiscernibles	(PII);	and	3)	Space	cannot	be	absolute	because	it	would	have	the	divine	
properties	of	infinity	and	eternity.		Leibniz	defines	place	as	a	relation	to	fixed	co-
																																																								
12	Ibid.,	64,	66	
13	Leibniz,	Gottfried	Wilhelm	Freiherr	von,	Discourse	on	Metaphysics	and	Other	Essays	
(Indianapolis:	Hackett	Publishing	Company,	1991),	§18			
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existents.14		Therefore,	A	and	B	share	the	same	place,	if	they	each	maintained	the	same	
proximity	to	C,	E,	F,	and	G,	at	different	times.		Space	is	that	which	comprehends	all	places.		
Furthermore,	Leibniz	questions	what	a	“real	space”,	void	of	all	bodies,	would	contain.		
Clarke	cannot	rebut	Leibniz’s	relational	theory	of	space,	except	by	suggesting	God	could	
move	the	universe	to	another	place,	producing	a	shock	from	the	acceleration,	to	the	bodies	
that	inhabit	it.15		It	is	true	that	acceleration	is	absolute,	and	not	in	the	same	category	as	
Leibniz’s	accounting	of	relative	motion.		The	argument	over	this	scenario	is	theological	in	
nature,	with	Leibniz	expressing	confidence	that	God	
would	never	move	the	universe	forward	or	
backward	in	space	without	reason.		The	second	
reason	against	absolute	space,	according	to	Leibniz,	
is	that	since	a	uniform	space	is	symmetrical,	it	is	
impossible	that	God,	“preserving	the	same	situations	
of	bodies	among	themselves,	should	have	placed	
them	in	space	after	one	certain	particular	manner,	
and	not	otherwise.”16		Figure	5	illustrates	the	
different	ways	in	which	space	could	be	arranged.		In	
other	words,	it	is	a	violation	of	the	PSR	that	God	
would	choose	arbitrarily.		Clarke	objects	that	the	
																																																								
14	Ibid.,	L,	V,	§47	
15	Ibid.,	C,	V,	§52-3	
16	Ibid.,	L,	III,	§5	
	 8	
indifferent	parts	of	space	should	not	hinder	God’s	will.17		With	
respect	to	the	PII,	absolute	space	violates	that	Leibnizian	principle	if	
we	imagine	transferring	all	the	matter	from	one	region	to	another	
since	no	“qualitative	description	could	distinguish	one	from	the	other”,	as	Tim	Maudlin	
distills	in	Philosophy	of	Physics.18		More	simply,	absolute	space	implies	an	infinite	number	of	
distinct	yet	qualitatively	identical	points,	meaning	that	by	the	PII,	it	cannot	exist.	GR	is	
consistent	with	the	PII	since	this	Principle	precludes	physical	laws	expressed	in	terms	of	
symmetries,	but	rather	supports	the	restriction	of	properties	to	be	relational	in	nature,	that	
is,	to	describe	entities	in	relation	to	all	other	entities.		An	event	in	GR	is	defined	as	an	
occurrence	(for	example,	the	firing	of	a	gun),	which	has	extension	in	neither	space	nor	time.		
GR	is	a	theory	that	models	the	relationship	between	events,	and	therefore	stays	true	to	
Leibniz’s	PII.		 
The	third	reason	Leibniz	has	to	object	to	space	being	absolute	is	that	Clarke	is	
defining	it	in	terms	of	a	property	that	has	extension.		A	body	“cannot	leave	its	extension”	if	
it	changes	space,	and	that	as	a	property,	it	cannot	first	belong	to	one	material	substance,	
then	an	immaterial	substance,	and	then	to	God	himself.19		To	which	Clarke	replies	that	
space	is	one	and	immense;	however,	Leibniz	would	maintain	that	this	conflates	divine	
properties	with	those	of	space.		God	would	“depend	upon	space”,	which	is	an	absurdity.20		
	 For	Leibniz,	motion	is	not	absolute	relative	to	a	fixed	entity	such	as	space.		Rather,	it	
is	relational	with	respect	to	bodies	considered	at	rest,	and	it	is	relative	in	the	sense	that	A	at	
																																																								
17	Ibid.,	C,	III,	§5	
18	Maudlin,	Tim,	Philosophy	of	Physics:	Space	and	Time	(Princeton	and	Oxford:	Princeton	
University	Press,	2012),	p.	41	
19	Ibid.,	L,	V,	§37-39	
20	Ibid.,	L,	V,	§49	
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rest	while	B	moves	2	units	to	the	east	is	equivalent	to	B	at	rest	while	A	moves	2	units	to	the	
west.		Leibniz’s	view	is	that	only	relative	motions	are	meaningful	and	that	there	are	no	
bodies	truly	at	rest	(Figure	6).		Newton’s	view	that	curvilinear	motions	are	absolute	but	
rectilinear	ones	are	relative	is	called	into	question	by	Leibniz’s	mathematical	derivation	of	
curves,	which	are	in	fact	compositions	of	
infinitely	many	rectilinear	tangent	lines	
(Figure	7).		In	the	curved	spacetime	of	GR,	
moving	on	non-straight	as	opposed	to	
straight	lines	does	indeed	correspond	with	
Newton’s	view,	since	the	former	refers	to	
accelerating	motion,	which	is	absolute.		At	
the	same	time,	as	we	have	seen,	there	is	no	
“absolute	space”	with	which	to	refer	any	
kind	of	motion.			
	 In	the	same	way	Leibniz	sees	space	as	an	order	or	relation,	he	defines	time	in	similar	
terms.		If	time	were	an	absolute	entity,	it	would	be	without	reason	for	God	to	create	
everything	in	a	certain	year	as	opposed	to	a	year	before,	which	is	in	violation	of	the	PSR.21		
Leibniz	understands	time	to	be	an	“order	of	successions”22	that	become	“instants”	which	
“perish	continually”	and	therefore	reasons	that	it	cannot	be	an	eternal	or	absolute	entity23.		
Clarke	does	not	directly	respond	to	that	claim,	but	does	argue	that	God’s	will	would	be	
sufficient	to	create	the	world	at	a	particular	point	in	time	even	if	there	is	no	true	difference	
																																																								
21	Ibid.,	L,	III,	§6	
22	Ibid.,	L,	III,	§4	
23	Ibid.,	L,	V,	§49	
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between	alternative	starting	points.		The	context	for	the	arguments	over	time	in	Leibniz-
Clarke	reflects	more	of	an	emphasis	on	pure	theology	in	comparison	with	the	discussions	of	
space	and	motion,	reducing	our	ability	to	‘superimpose’	GR	onto	that	issue	dealt	with	by	
the	two	philosophers.	
																																			 	
The	Symmetries	of	Space	for	Leibniz	and	Clarke		
	 Though	Leibniz	and	Clarke	had	their	share	of	differences,	they	both	relied	on	
Newton’s	presumed	geometrical	structure	of	absolute	space	of	E3:	the	three	dimensional	
geometry	described	by	Euclid’s	postulates.		This	space	is	highly	symmetric,	and	the	
symmetries	are	demonstrated	by	isometries,	which	are	defined	as	“mappings	of	the	space	
onto	itself	that	preserve	distances	among	the	points.”24		There	are	two	kinds	of	symmetries	
–	translational,	which	refers	to	a	moving	of	all	points	an	equal	distance	in	a	rectilinear	
fashion,	and	rotational,	or	a	turning	of	points	about	an	axis	(See	Figure	5).		Translational	
symmetry	is	called	homogenous	and	rotational	symmetry	is	called	isotropic.		E3	is	
completely	homogenous	and	isotropic,	and	it	is	these	spatial	features,	which	are	pivotal	in	
Leibniz-Clarke.		As	Figure	5	demonstrates,	the	symmetry	of	Euclidean	space	is	such	that	“a	
system	of	matter	would	fit	in	any	place	and	with	any	orientation.”25		Any	pair	of	those	
transformations	are	equivalent	to	each	other	and	thus,	in	an	absolute	Euclidean	space,	“God	
																																																								
24	Maudlin,	Tim,	Philosophy	of	Physics,	p.	34	
25	Ibid.,	p.	37	
		Figure	7.		Source:	Dr.	Thomas	Ryckman	
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will	produce	neither	of	them”	because	they	are	equally	good	and	“none	has	the	advantage	
over	the	other”,	according	to	Leibniz.26		Leibniz	relies	heavily	on	the	PSR	to	make	his	case.		
Maudlin	hypothesizes:	“if	we	abandon	[the	presumption	of	E3]	and	postulate	a	space	that	
lacks	these	[homogenous	and	isotropic]	symmetries,	the	PSR	argument	cannot	get	off	the	
ground.”27		As	we	will	seek	to	understand	in	greater	detail,	this	hypothesis	is	very	relevant	
once	we	think	about	physics	within	the	context	of	GR.				
The	Roots	and	Model	of	Einstein’s	General	Theory	of	Relativity		
	 The	General	Theory	of	Relativity	has	its	roots	in	what	
Einstein	dubbed	to	be	the	“happiest	thought	of	his	life”28	–	
that	the	gravitational	field	only	has	a	relative	existence.		The	
Principle	of	Equivalence	states	that	uniform	acceleration	
without	gravity	feels	the	same	as	being	at	rest	in	a	
homogeneous	gravitational	field.		Furthermore,	acceleration	
(free	fall)	in	a	gravitational	field	is	the	equivalent	of	
hovering	freely	in	outer	space	where	there	is	no	gravity.		The	
significance	of	this	Principle	is	that	Einstein	discovered	that	
inertia,	or	the	tendency	for	a	body	to	remain	at	rest	or	in	motion,	is	directly	related	with	
gravity.		Together	they	constitute	the	inertio-gravitational	field,	which	is	relative	to	the	
state	of	motion	of	the	observer.		However,	the	gravitational	field	is	not	perfectly	uniform,	
since	bodies	fall	slightly	angled	toward	the	center	of	the	earth,	rather	than	in	parallel	
																																																								
26	Ibid.,	L,	IV,	§19	
27	Ibid.,	39	
28	Dr.	Thomas	Ryckman	lecture,	UC	Berkeley,	April	10th,	2014	
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lines.29		Each	point	of	the	field	corresponds	with	a	metric	tensor	gμν,	which	determines	how	
the	volume	of	matter-energy	changes.		There	is	a	reciprocal	relationship	and	equality	
between	the	curvature	of	spacetime	and	the	volume	and	density	of	matter-energy.		This	
gravitational	equation	is	known	as	the	Einstein	Field	Equation:	Rμν	−	½	gμν	R	=	κ	Tμν,	which	
reads	from	left	to	right	as	spacetime	curvature	tells	matter-energy	how	to	move,	and	from	
right	to	left	as	matter-energy	tells	spacetime	how	to	bend.		Since	spacetime	curvature	itself	
carries	energy	and	so	is	a	
source	of	itself,	the	complete	
distribution	of	matter	and	
energy	only	constrains	rather	
than	determines	spacetime	
curvature.		The	tensors	
describe	a	spacetime	that	has	a	
variable	curvature	that	Maudlin	defines	as	follows:	“it	can	be	flat	in	some	places,	positively	
curved	in	others,	and	negatively	curved	in	yet	others.		Or	[it]	may	always	have	the	same	
sort	of	curvature	but	different	amounts	in	different	places.”30		Figures		8a	and	8b	illustrate	
spaces	that	are	constant	positive	and	negatively	curved	respectively.		As	we	have	seen	the	
curvature	in	part	depends	on	the	distribution	of	matter-energy,	and	vice-versa.		Geroch	
provides	a	useful	analogy	in	the	form	of	a	steel	ball	placed	on	a	rubber	sheet.		There	is	an	
interplay	between	the	matter	and	the	curvature	of	the	sheet	(Figure	9).		In	a	more	complex	
illustration,	it	is	the	curvature	of	the	sheet	that	produces	dynamical	effects	on	the	
																																																								
29	Maudlin,	Tim,	Philosophy	of	Physics:	Space	and	Time,	p.	135	
30	Ibid.,	130-1	
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movements	of	the	matter	(Figure	10).		To	place	the	curvature	of	spacetime	in	a	more	
concrete	context,	one	can	think	of	the	actual	shape	of	the	spherical	earth	in	comparison	to	
its	depiction	in	a	flat	world	
map	–	obviously	the	latter	
visualization	distorts	the	
spatial	relationships	
between	different	points	on	
the	globe.		Einstein	realized	
that	physics	had	a	distorted	view	of	spacetime	in	the	same	way.		Where	there	are	massive	
objects	such	as	stars	in	the	universe,	the	pace	at	which	time	progresses	is	slower	as	one	
moves	toward	the	center	of	mass–	in	Figure	11,	the	middle	section	refers	to	the	inside	of	a	
dense	star	where	the	experienced	time	per	turn	around	the	spacetime	is	shorter,	since	in	
that	region,	gravitational	
acceleration	(i.e.,	density)	is	
greatest.		This	insight	is	drawn	
from	SR,	in	which	moving	clocks	
tick	more	slowly.	Space,	represented	as	one	goes	through	the	hourglass	shape	(in	this	
hypothetical	particular	region	of	spacetime)	is	also	curved	due	to	varying	degrees	of	
density.		We	know	this	since	falling	objects	appear	to	fall	along	a	curved	path,	when	in	fact	
they	are	moving	in	nearly	straight	lines	in	a	curved	space.			
Discussions	of	gravity	in	Leibniz-Clarke	anticipate	how	Einstein	dealt	with	that	
phenomenon	in	GR.		Newton	uncovered	gravity	but	famously	failed	to	find	its	cause	or	
mechanism.	In	Leibniz’s	Fifth	Paper	of	the	Correspondence,	he	argues	gravity	is	either	
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miraculous	or	produced	by	motions	of	some	fluid	or	other	bodies	–	“A	body	is	never	moved	
naturally,	except	by	another	body	which	touches	it	and	pushes	it;	after	that	it	continues	
until	it	is	prevented	by	another	body	which	touches	it.”31		This	hypothesis	is	close	to	
Descartes’	“plenum”,	where	vortices	of	aether	propel	the	planets	and	comets	to	move	
around	in	orbits	and	other	paths,	respectively	(Figures	12a	and	12b).		In	one	sense,	this	
model	is	similar	to	Einstein’s	gravitational	field32	since	in	GR,	“there	is	no	‘force	of	
gravity’”33,	and	it	is	in	fact	bodies	which	have	an	impact	on	each	other	through	their	effects	
on	spacetime	curvature.		Spacetime	geometry	acts	as	an	“intermediary”	between	multiple	
bodies,	Geroch	explains.34		This	can	be	illustrated	in	Figure	10	where	there	are	two	massive	
bodies	in	the	world,	and	“each	moves	in	a	certain	way	in	response	to	the	curvature	caused	
by	the	other”.35	
		
	
	
	
	
																																																								
31	Ibid.,	L,	V,	§35	
32	Indeed,	in	his	essay,	“Relativity	and	the	Problem	of	Space,”	Einstein	concludes	that	GR	
represents	an	extension	of	Descartes’	intuition	since	there	is	no	space	without	the	
gravitational	field.	“[The	existence	of	an	empty	space]	requires	the	idea	of	the	field	as	the	
representative	of	reality,	in	combination	with	the	general	principle	of	relativity,	to	show	
the	true	kernel	of	Descartes’	idea;	there	exists	no	space	‘empty	of	field.’”		See	footnote	#19	
for	citation.	
33	Ibid.,	135	
34	Ibid.,	181	
35	“	”	
	 15	
	
Would	God	perform	a	diffeomorphism	on	spacetime?	
			 As	Figure	3	shows,	so	long	as	the	tensors	remain	unchanged,	the	matter-energy	can	
be	moved	via	a	new	function,	and	the	two	functions	will	describe	the	exact	same	
gravitational	field.		The	diffeomorphism	preserves	the	differentiable	structure,	mapping	
smooth	curves	onto	smooth	curves.		The	functions	only	differ	by	a	coordinate	
transformation.		Though	the	dynamically	curved	spacetime	in	GR	is	clearly	not	uniform,	a	
diffeomorphism	represents	the	equivalent	of	a	shift	of	the	universe	discussed	by	Leibniz	
and	Clarke.		The	two	spatial	locations	in	the	diffeomorphism	in	Figure	3:	M	=	<M,	gμν	,	Tμν	>	
and	M’	=	<M’,	φ*gμν	,	φ*Tμν	>	contain	the	same	spacetime	structure	and	physical	content	
distribution,	representing	the	same	field.		It	seems	then	that	Leibniz	may	have	the	same	
concern	over	attributing	a	reality	to	spacetime	and	the	metric	field	as	he	did	with	the	
uniform	and	symmetric	space	taken	as	a	premise	in	Leibniz-Clarke.		To	return	briefly	to	the	
correspondence	–	Clarke’s	space	has	a	reality	since	there	is	a	difference	depending	on	its	
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location,	whereas	Leibniz’s	space	is	purely	comprised	of	relations,	and	so	therefore	it	
makes	no	difference	where	in	the	universe	these	relations	are	situated.		In	order	to	place	
GR	within	the	context	of	Leibniz-Clarke,	we	must	more	precisely	understand	the	
philosophical	debates	surrounding	Einstein’s	claim	that	spacetime	is	a	structural	quality	of	
the	metric	field.			
	 If	spacetime	is	constituted	of	“parts”	–	regions	and	points,	then	that	would	favor	
Clarke’s	viewpoint	since	there	would	
be	different	yet	indiscernible	
situations.		There	are	at	least	a	couple	
of	variations	within	this	school	of	
thought	known	as		 manifold	
substantivalism.		Clarke,	who	defines	
space	as	a	property	and	also	in	terms	
of	extension,	represents	a	
combination	of	the	two	
substantivalist	versions:	field	
theories	contend	spacetime	points	
are	individuals	and	the	field	
quantities	are	properties,	while	
particle	theories	posit	that	particles	are	individuals	and	spacetime	locations	are	among	
their	properties.		Reconciling	this	viewpoint	with	the	theological	debate	within	Leibniz-
Clarke:	Leibniz’s	PSR	would	not	be	violated	if	God	moved	the	universe	from	one	region	to	
another	since	the	substantivalist	sees	these	two	alternatives	as	distinct	states	of	affairs.		Of	
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course,	this	understanding	of	spacetime	is	not	what	Leibniz	had	in	mind	for	space,	since	it	
assigns	a	very	concrete	definition	to	what	he	saw	as	an	abstract	entity.			
Furthermore,	there	are	a	number	of	contemporary	objections	to	manifold	
substantivalism.		First,	the	past	and	future	cannot	be	distinguished	nor	can	distance	
relations	be	defined.		Second,	spacetime	
points	do	not	have	an	“active	power”,	an	
implication	of	this	theory.		Third,	through	
Einstein’s	‘point-coincidence’	solution	to	the	
‘Hole	Argument’	(Figures	13a		and	13b),	we	
know	spacetime	points	are	individuated	
only	through	the	physical	metric	field,	even	
if	the	mathematical	function	transforms.		
The	points	themselves	do	not	have	a	
physical	reality	–	rather,	it	is	defined	by	the	
set	of	intersections	of	world	lines	of	bodies	(their	trajectory	over	time),	or	physical	events.			
	 There	are	two	similar	perspectives	that	build	off	of	the	objections	to	manifold	
substantivalism:	metric	field	substantivalism	and	relationism36.		The	relationist	and	metric	
field	substantivalist	would	agree	that	what	constitutes	reality	is	“the	set	of	spacetime	
points	that	are	actually	occupied	by	material	objects	or	processes”37.		One	concern	for	
																																																								
36	Substantivalists	stress	the	continuities	between	the	absolute	inertial	structures	of	
Newtonian	space	and	Minkowski	space-time	and	GR.		Relationists	argue	only	relations	of	
contiguity	between	various	dynamical	fields	are	physically	meaningful	(Dr.	Thomas	
Ryckman	lecture,	UC	Berkeley,	April	22nd,	2014)	
37	Friedman,	Michael,	The	Foundations	of	Space-Time	Theories	(Princeton:	Princeton	
University	Press,	1986),	p.217	
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relationists	and	these	more	sophisticated	substantivalists	is	how	to	account	for	points	that	
possibly	will	be	occupied	in	the	future.		Nonetheless,	I	would	argue	that	it	is	these	schools	
of	thought	that	are	most	consistent	with	Einstein’s	perspective	and	that	of	Leibniz.		For	if	
spacetime’s	reality	is	only	as	great	as	the	events	that	occur	on	the	metric	field,	the	“shift”	in	
Leibniz-Clarke	represents	nothing	more	than	the	equivalent	of	a	change	in	its	mathematical	
description,	rather	than	its	physicality.		Would	God	perform	a	diffeomorphism	on	
spacetime?		The	answer	to	that	question	of	course	depends	on	whether	He	is	a	relationist	
or	a	manifold	substantivalist.			
Relationism	vs.	Absolutism	in	GR	
If	the	world	be	finite	in	dimensions,	it	is	moveable	by	the	power	of	God	and	
therefore	my	argument	drawn	from	that	moveableness	is	conclusive.		Two	
places,	though	exactly	alike,	are	not	the	same	place.		Nor	is	the	motion	or	rest	of	
the	universe,	the	same	state;	any	more	than	the	motion	or	rest	of	a	ship,	is	the	
same	state,	because	a	man	shut	up	in	the	cabin	cannot	perceive	whether	the	
ship	sails	or	not,	so	long	as	it	moves	uniformly.		The	motion	of	the	ship,	though	
the	man	perceives	it	not,	is	a	real	different	state,	and	has	real	different	effects;	
and,	upon	a	sudden	stop,	it	would	have	other	real	effects;	and	so	likewise	would	
an	indiscernible	motion	of	the	universe.		To	this	argument,	no	answer	has	ever	
been	given.	(Clarke,	IV,	§13)	
	 As	the	above	quote	demonstrates,	for	Clarke,	who	draws	on	Newton’s	example	of	a	
moving	ship,	absolute	motion	is	indeed	possible.		This	motion,	if	not	with	respect	to	other	
bodies,	must	be	with	respect	to	an	entity	–	space,	which	for	Clarke,	is	fixed.		In	comparison	
with	the	spacetime	of	GR,	there	is	a	partial	overlap	insofar	as	there	is	a	“world	structure”	in	
the	words	of	mathematician	Hermann	Weyl.		We	know	there	is	this	structure	because	of	
the	inequivalence	of	different	states	of	motion.		Weyl	echoes	Clarke:	“Without	a	world	
structure	the	concept	of	relative	motion	of	several	bodies	has…	no	more	foundation	than	
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the	concept	of	absolute	motion	of	a	single	body.”38		In	GR,	it	is	with	respect	to	the	affine39	
structure	of	spacetime	that	one	can	determine	whether	a	given	particle	is	accelerating	or	
rotating.		In	this	sense,	there	is	an	‘absolutism’	in	GR.		However,	it	is	not	a	classical	
absolutism	for	this	structure	is	not	fixed	but	rather	“dynamically	depends	on	surrounding	
matter	and	energies”40.		Through	the	steel	balls	on	a	rubber	sheet	analogy	supplied	by	
Geroch,	we	know	there	is	a	dynamic	relationship	between	the	curvature	of	spacetime	and	
the	distribution	of	matter-energy.		Moreover,	the	gravitational	field	itself	moves	with	
respect	to	other	fields.41		In	this	context,	then,	there	is	a	merging	of	absolutism	with	
relationism,	but	one	with	a	greater	degree	of	the	latter.		When	we	consider	the	
philosophical	difference	between	background	dependence,	wherein	the	structure	limits	the	
evolution	of	matter	but	is	not	acted	upon	by	said	matter,	and	background	independence,	
wherein	the	structure	is	always	and	everywhere	dynamical,	GR	falls	into	the	latter	
category.					
Does	Determinism	fail	in	reality,	or	just	in	GR?	
For	God,	being	moved	by	his	supreme	reason	to	choose,	among	many	series	of	
things	or	worlds	possible,	that,	in	which	free	creatures	should	take	such	or	such	
resolutions,	though	not	without	his	concourse;	has	thereby	rendered	every	
event	certain	and	determined	once	for	all;	without	derogating	thereby	from	the	
liberty	of	those	creatures:	that	simple	decree	of	choice,	not	at	all	changing,	but	
only	actualizing	their	free	natures,	which	he	saw	in	his	ideas.	(Leibniz,	V,	§6)	
																																																								
38	Weyl,	Hermann,	Philosophie	der	Mathematik	und	Naturwissenschaften	(Germany:	R.	
Oldenbourg,	1926)	
39	Affine	structures	are	those	where	there	is	a	distinction	between	straight	lines	and	other	
lines.		If	a	particle	deviates	from	a	straight	line,	it	is	accelerating	on	absolute	terms.			
40	Dr.	Thomas	Ryckman	lecture,	UC	Berkeley,	April	17th,	2014	
41	Rovelli,	Carlo.	“Quantum	spacetime:	What	do	we	know?”,	“There	is	no	absolute	referent	
of	motion	in	GR:	the	dynamical	fields	‘move’	with	respect	to	each	other”	(p.	108)	
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The	gravitational	field	influences	and	even	determines	the	metrical	laws	of	the	
spacetime	continuum.	(Einstein,	“The	Meaning	of	Relativity”,	p.	67)	 	
	 As	we	have	seen,	the	Einstein	Field	Equations	mathematically	describe	the	
curvature	of	spacetime	in	GR.		Specifically,	
there	are	ten	equations	that	one	solves	for	
independent	values	of	the	metric	tensor	gμν	
(x).		Because	of	this	mathematical	
predictability,	there	is	a	‘global’	determinism	
in	the	sense	that	the	past	and	future	states	of	
the	world	can	be	calculated	based	on	the	
instantaneous	state	of	the	distribution	of	
matter-energy	and	the	corresponding	
curvature	of	spacetime	(Figure	14).		A	more	
radical	form	of	determinism	-local	determinism,	fails	when	
one	revisits	the	implications	of	the	Hole	Argument,	since	
descriptions	of	fields	outside	the	region	do	not	uniquely	
determine	the	fields	within	the	region	in	question.		In	
1917,	the	determinism	in	the	field	equations	was	
complicated	by	Einstein’s	addition	of	a	cosmological	term	
Λ	as	a	coefficient	of	gμν.		The	Jesuit	priest	George	Lemaître,	
a	physicist	at	Université	Catholique	de	Louvain	in	Belgium	
(Figure	15),	showed	that	there	are	solutions	to	the	field	
equations	with	this	constant	demonstrating	the	universe	
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began	with	a	singularity	(“The	Big	Bang”)	and	subsequently	expanded.		The	cosmological	
term	represented	a	force	that	acted	counter	to	gravitational	attraction,	since	the	
centriptetal	force	serves	to	direct	bodies	toward	the	center.		By	modeling	density	as	we	go	
back	in	time	to	an	initial	
condition	of	high	density,	
Lemaître	charted	different	
scenarios	of	how	the	world	
evolves,	but	all	of	which	begin	
with	The	Big	Bang	(Figure	16).		
The	other	kind	of	singularity	
poses	potential	problems	for	determinism	since	it	represents	a	breakdown	of	spacetime.		A	
black	hole	is	when	spacetime	curvature	reaches	such	a	high	level,	that	the	velocity	required	
to	escape	from	it	is	greater	than	the	speed	of	light,	and	therefore	nothing	can	escape	from	
it.		It	is	thus	within	these	black	holes	that	there	is	a	suspension	of	the	laws	of	nature	as	
Einstein	collaborator	Peter	Bergmann	indicated	in	1980,	suggesting	a	form	of	
indeterminism,	posing	a	problem	for	GR	–	since	there	is	empirical	evidence	that	a	typical	
galaxy	“could	well	contain	tens	or	even	hundreds	of	millions	of	stellar	black	holes.”42		As	I	
will	show,	the	black	holes	could	represent	the	key	to	understanding	the	history	of	the	
universe	before	The	Big	Bang,	and	its	trajectory	well	into	the	future.					
	
	
																																																								
42	Dr.	Thomas	Ryckman	lecture,	UC	Berkeley,	April	24th,	2014	
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The	Search	for	a	Unified	Theory	and	the	Importance	of	Foundational	Questions		
For	every	property	of	nature	which	might	be	otherwise,	there	must	be	a	
rational	reason	which	is	sufficient	to	explain	that	choice.																																														
–	G.W.	Leibniz,	Principle	of	Sufficient	Reason	
Theoretical	physicist	Carlo	Rovelli	has	declared	that	his	field	is	at	a	crossroads:	
finding	a	new	synthesis	between	Quantum	mechanics	(QM),	which	formulates	a	relational	
theory	of	physical	systems	based	on	probabilities	and	epistemological	considerations43,	
and	GR,	which	“describes	the	world	as	a	set	of	interacting	fields	including	gμν	(x)	and	
possibly	other	objects”	and	defines	motion	only	in	terms	of	“positions	and	displacements	of	
these	dynamical	objects	relative	to	each	other.”44		Through	both	theories,	we	know	that	we	
live	in	a	quantum	spacetime.		To	understand	what	that	means,	Rovelli	argues,	physics	must	
return	to	philosophical	and	conceptual	questions:	What	is	matter?		What	is	causality?		What	
is	the	meaning	of	motion?		Is	motion	to	be	defined	only	with	respect	to	objects	or	to	space?		
What	is	the	role	of	the	observer?		What	is	time?		It	is	the	answers	to	these	questions,	which	
will	govern	the	future	of	a	theory	of	quantum	gravity,	for	instance.			
Physics	continues	to	rely	on	notions	of	absolute	time,	when	in	fact	GR	shows	that	it	
is	a	problematic	variable	since	there	is	no	“true	time”45.		GR’s	focus	on	events	is	an	
extension	of	Leibniz’s	definition	of	time	to	be	the	mere	ordering	of	things.		Matter	may	also	
become	increasingly	secondary	since	in	QM,	basic	observables	such	as	length,	area,	or	
																																																								
43	Callender,	Craig	and	Nick	Huggett	(editors),	Physics	Meets	Philosophy	at	the	Planck	
Scale:	Contemporary	Theories	in	Quantum	Gravity	(Cambridge,	UK:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	2001),	Rovelli,	Carlo,	“Quantum	spacetime:	What	do	we	know?”	chapter,	“What	we	
can	say	about	the	properties	that	the	system	will	have	the	day	after	tomorrow	is	not	
determined	just	by	what	we	can	say	about	the	system	today,	but	also	on	what	we	will	be	
able	to	say	about	the	system	tomorrow,”	p.	104	
44	Ibid.,	108	
45	Ibid.,	112	
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volume	are	mere	proxies	for	geometrical	features	of	the	gravitational	field	–	therefore	a	
state	of	spacetime	“will	be	a	continuous	quantum	superposition	of	states	whose	geometry	
has	discrete	features,	not	a	collection	of	elementary	discrete	objects.”46	
Echoing	Aristotelian	and	Cartesian	accounts	of	motion,	Einstein’s	GR	suggests	the	
dynamics	of	the	gravitational	field	are	fully	relational.		If	one	thinks	of	GR	in	absolutist	
terms,	in	the	sense	that	location	can	be	defined	with	respect	to	the	gravitational	field,	
Rovelli	contends	that	is	misguided	since	the	field	
itself	moves	through	its	vibrations47.		We	know	
from	QM	that	every	dynamical	object	has	
quantum	properties.		Therefore,	spacetime	must	
exhibit	quantum	properties.		Despite	this	very	
apparent	way	to	synthesize	GR	and	QM,	
conventional	Quantum	Field	Theories	(QFTs)	
assume	a	fixed,	non-dynamical	stage	as	the	
background	metric	structure,	akin	to	the	entity	
Clarke	argued	for	in	his	correspondence	with	
Leibniz.		This	is	the	approach	taken	by	string	
theory48,	which	makes	“definite	predictions	about	the	type	of	particles	that	exist	in	nature”	
and	postulates	“supersymmetry”,	such	that	for	every	force	particle	(boson)	there	is	a	
																																																								
46	Ibid.,	110	
47	Ibid.,	p.	108	
48	There	is	evidence	that	string	theories	(on	fixed	backgrounds)	are	consistent	to	2nd	order	
in	a	certain	approximation	scheme.	Source:	Dr.	Thomas	Ryckman	lecture,	UC	Berkeley,	May	
1st,	2014	
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corresponding	matter	(fermion)	partner49.		However,	recent	experiments	at	the	Large	
Hadron	Collider	in	Geneva	(Figure	17)	have	not	been	able	to	find	any	signs	of	
supersymmetry.			
	 To	construct	a	better	theory,	Rovelli	makes	two	major	recommendations:	first,	there	
should	be	no	independent	time	variable	‘along’	
which	dynamics	‘happen’	–	rather	we	can	use	
statistical	descriptions	of	system	states;	second,	
the	meaning	of	QM	is	that	the	properties	of	any	
system	are	contingent	relative	to	a	second	
physical	system.		Loop	Quantum	Gravity	(LQG),	a	
unified	theory	(of	GR	and	QM,	that	is)	whose	
founders	include	Rovelli,	argues	space	is	
analogous	to	an	extremely	fine	fabric	woven	
together	by	“one	dimensional	intersecting	
quantum	excitations”	which	can	be	represented	by	spin	networks	(Figure	18)	-	abstract	
graphs	that	are	purely	relational	structures.		How	can	relational	structures	be	understood	
without	unitary	time?		Rovelli	explains	that	diffeomorphism	invariant	quantities	(i.e.,	those	
that	are	independent	of	coordinates)	“express	the	value	of	certain	variables	‘when	and	
where’	certain	other	quantities	have	certain	given	values.”50		In	other	words,	properties	of	
systems	can	only	be	determined	vis-à-vis	relative	notions	of	space	and	time.			
																																																								
49	Dr.	Thomas	Ryckman	lecture,	UC	Berkeley,	April	29th,	2014	
50	Ibid.,	114	
	 25	
Lee	Smolin,	a	fellow	founder	of	LQG,	argues	Leibniz’s	PSR	is	fundamental	to	
relational	and	background	
independence	and	by	extension	the	
ultimate	cosmological	theory	of	
everything	–	one	that	postulates	the	
origins	of	our	universe	and	the	
prospects	for	a	multiverse	(a	
population	of	universes).51		Background	
independence	not	only	facilitates	a	
physics	of	dynamical	processes	but	also	an	evolution	of	laws	in	different	regions	and	
epochs	of	the	universe.		The	link	with	sufficient	reason	is	that	mathematical	consistency	
alone,	Smolin	reminds	us,	cannot	account	for	the	current	set	of	laws	we	observe	governing	
phenomena.		Explanations	of	a	unique	initial	state	of	the	universe	that	are	not	falsifiable	
close	off	further	inquiry	and	violate	the	PSR.		Rather	than	see	what	Leibniz	dubbed	“one	of	
the	greatest	[principles]”52	as	unattainable	since	we	rarely	know	the	complete	reason	why	
something	in	nature	has	a	given	property	rather	than	not,	Smolin	maintains	we	can	still	be	
faithful	to	the	PSR	“by	accepting	explanations	that	leave	room	for	further	developments	
that	may	improve	our	understanding	of	the	past.”53		This	approach	is	in	contrast	to	what	
Smolin	calls	the	Newtonian	paradigm,	which	distinguishes	between	the	role	of	initial	state	
and	dynamical	law.		In	small	subsystems,	scientists	can	observe	what	aspects	of	evolution	
																																																								
51	Smolin,	Lee,	“A	perspective	on	the	landscape	problem”,	February	16th,	2012	
52	Leibniz,	Gottfried	Wilhelm,	Philosophical	Papers	and	Letters:	A	Selection,	ed.	Leroy	E.	
Loemker.	2d	ed.,	(Dordrect:	D.	Reidel,	1969),	p.	227		
53	Lee	Smolin,	“A	perspective	on	the	landscape	problem”,	p.	10	
	 26	
are	due	to	state	and	which	are	derived	from	a	dynamical	law,	by	repeating	the	experiment	
with	many	different	initial	states.		In	the	case	of	the	
universe,	there	is	only	a	single	history,	and	so	
therefore	any	theory	must	furnish	its	own	sufficient	
reason	for	initial	conditions	and	the	evolution	in	
physical	laws.			
What	then	are	the	implications	for	an	
evolving	set	of	natural	laws?		In	the	1960s,	John	
Wheeler	theorized	quantum	effects	would	eliminate	
the	singularities	of	GR	in	black	holes	(Figure	19)	such	
that	those	regions	of	spacetime	would	expand	again,	
“forming	new	regions	of	spacetime	to	the	future	of	where	those	singularities	would	have	
been.”54		Indeed,	this	idea	corresponds	to	one	of	the	three	possibilities	Smolin	identifies	as	
a	global	structure	of	the	larger	universe:	in	this	scenario,	the	Big	Bang	was	the	result	of	a	
‘bounce’	(the	elimination	of	singularities	through	quantum	effects	cited	above)	of	a	black	
hole	singularity,	meaning	for	every	black	hole	there	will	be	a	universe	produced	once	it	
collapses.		With	at	least	1018	black	holes	in	our	universe,	this	is	what	Smolin	calls	the	
Branching	scenario,	since	each	universe	has	one	parent	but	many	progeny.55		The	other	two	
scenarios	are:	Pluralistic,	meaning	an	infinite	population	of	universes	(Figure	20)	that	were	
derived	from	a	primordial	state	by	a	one	stage	process,	each	distinct	from	each	other;	and	
Linear	cyclic	in	which	there	is	a	succession	of	universes,	each	with	a	single	parent	and	a	
																																																								
54	Ibid.,	6	
55	Ibid.,	16	
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single	ancestor.		Staying	true	to	the	Leibnizian	idea	of	explaining	why	laws	are	what	they	
are,	Smolin	delineates	the	parameters	that	govern	changes	in	laws	in	each	of	the	scenarios:	
these	range	from	balancing	density	increases	(which	result	from	a	shrinking	of	the	
universe)	that	lead	to	more	black	holes	against	the	trend	of	fewer	stars	(due	to	a	smaller	
universe)	producing	fewer	black	holes	(Branching),	to	avoiding	paradoxes	(involving	
infinity)	of	comparing	probabilities	of	given	properties56	in	an	infinite	population	of	
universes	(Pluralistic),	and	finally	to	‘attractors’	which	serve	as	a	convergence	point	for	
evolving	laws	such	that	the	changes	are	small	from	generation	to	generation	(Linear	cyclic).	
Smolin	convincingly	argues	that	the	future	of	physics	lies	in	transcending	the	
Newtonian	paradigm,	which	takes	the	initial	state	as	an	input	without	explanation,	and	
instead	constructing	
theories	that	posit	an	
evolving	set	of	laws	in	a	
falsifiable	manner,	paying	
homage	to	Leibniz’s	
Principle	of	Sufficient	
Reason.		In	addition,	a	
relationist	unified	theory	
(again,	in	the	spirit	of	
																																																								
56	In	an	infinite	population	of	universes,	probabilities	of	“Outcome	A”	in	comparison	with	
“Outcome	B”	become	difficult	to	discern	when	the	frequencies	of	both	outcomes	are	
infinite.	
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Leibniz57)	is	more	falsifiable	and	by	its	very	nature	of	removing	background	layers	from	
previous	theories	and	finding	solutions	that	explain	dimension	and	topology	which	had	
been	fixed,	it	spurs	advancements	in	scientific	knowledge	that	should	culminate	in	a	
greater	understanding	of	the	causal	history	of	the	universe	and	its	future,	illustrating	the	
importance	of	the	Leibniz-Clarke	debate	to	modern	day	theoretical	physics.		Ultimately,	the	
truest	possible	cosmological	theory	may	require	a	granting	of	Princess	Caroline’s	wish	–	a	
rapprochement	between	the	relationists	and	the	string	theorists	who	rely	in	some	sense	on	
an	absolutist	framework,	to	forge	a	unified	theory	that	reflects	the	full	extent	of	the	
universe,	in	space	and	time.	
______________________________	
	
	
																																																								
57	The	philosophical	alternative	to	the	Leibnizian	model	is	Platonic	which	emphasizes	
symmetry	in	a	spacetime	background	and	in	classification	of	particles	that	transform	under	
this	symmetry.		Dr.	Thomas	Ryckman	lecture,	UC	Berkeley,	May	1st,	2014	
